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Social Capital, Trust, and the
Agribusiness  of Economics
Paul N. Wilson
Economists, including agricultural economists, have a long history of  recognizing the
importance  of the behavioral foundations in decision  making while ignoring these
observable  human dimensions in their  economic models.  The  economics  of social
capital and trust, two important human characteristics  influencing decisions, have
captured the attention of economists in recent years. Recent empirical work demon-
strates that social capital and trust considerations are prevalent and economically
significant, especially in business. Trust alters the terms of trade, generates decision
flexibility, reduces transaction costs, and creates additional time resources for man-
agement.
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Introduction
Economists ... see the market from beyond the market, not as the marketer sees
it, who participates  in it, but as an external spectator  sees it, who views it from
without. Therefore, they see only the bare  outward show which alone can disclose
itself  to an unimplicated  observer. They see the bare outward behavior and are
blind to the norm which animates it and regulates it and confers upon it, for the
persons who enact it, its social meaning.
-J.  F. A. Taylor (1966, p.  103)
Criticisms by economists and other social science colleagues of our mainstream economic
theory of the business firm reveal both relevant insight and narrow naivete on the part
of the critics  (Ansoff; Joskow; Mirowski;  Kay).  Economics, including agricultural  eco-
nomics, indeed has moved away from in-depth study of"marketers." The identity, or the
humanness, of agents in a transaction is assumed away in most of our analytical models.
Market phenomena and behaviorally sterile representative firms have been our teaching
and research foci. Yet our conventional  analytical assumptions of perfect information
and narrow self-interest are suspect when held up to the microscope of observed human
behavior. Even our holy grail of Friedmanite predictive power goes largely unvalidated
when compared to the culture of replicability in the physical sciences.
In our defense, the economic way of thinking and our standard neoclassical tools have
proven to be valuable contributors  to policy analysis for decades.  Recent advances  in
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economic theory also have generated useful theoretical insights on organizational and
managerial behavior. In the last 15 years, game theory, transaction costs economics, and
the economics of strategy have moved the economics profession toward economic analysis
where the identity of the agents in a transaction matters (Williamson 1985; Milgrom and
Roberts; Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley). Slowly we are recognizing that the economics
of business organization  and  management  is not faceless.  Identity-based  economics
presents our  discipline with the opportunity  to establish  an even  stronger  scientific
foundation  of business, including agribusiness.  These increasingly  diverse economic
tools, based  on rigorous economic  thought and analysis, are recognized by some as a
strength of our discipline rather than a weakness  of our scientific enterprise.
Should economists  care about the humanness of their science?  Should our science
concern itself with the complicated behavioral foundations  of economic choices under
constraints? If we answer these questions in the affirmative, then we are challenged to
understand what "marketers"  or business managers  do with their scarcest  resource,
their time, and how they make (or how they should make) their decisions. Over his long
career of studying business managers, Kotter discovered that human interaction domi-
nated their workday. Managers focused on establishing social connectedness with their
employees. Marginal allocative decision making was ubiquitous and largely taken for
granted. Time  allocation  decisions  emphasized  working with and through people  to
accomplish business goals.
This human dimension of economics was not lost on Adam Smith or on more contemp-
orary economists (e.g., Sen). In his visionary 1890 work, Principles  ofEconomics, British
economist Alfred Marshall noted:
Economics is a study of men as they live and move and think in the ordinary business of life.
But it concerns  itself chiefly  with those motives which  affect,  most powerfully  and most
steadily,  man's conduct in the business part of his life.  Everyone  who is worth  anything
carries his higher nature with him into business;  and, there, as elsewhere,  he is influenced
by his personal affections, by his conceptions of duty, and his reverence for high ideals (p. 14).
Ronald Coase's significant and well-known 1937 contribution, "The Nature of the Firm,"
provided an analysis of why firms exist at all.  Coase concluded:
A firm, therefore, consists of the system of relationships which comes into existence when
the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur  (pp. 41-42).
Kenneth Arrow, in his 1972 article, "Gifts and Exchanges," extended this definition by
adding that trust in these relationships is critical for efficient transactions:
Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any
transaction  conducted over a period of time (p. 357).
Finally, David Kreps, in his 1990 treatise, "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory,"
has taken the above insights and redefined the firm as
... an intangible asset carrying a reputation that is beneficial for efficient transactions,
conferring that reputation upon whoever currently owns the asset (pp. 94-95).
Under Kreps' definition, the firm becomes a reputation bearer, with the reputation
based on a foundation of enduring relationships. In this formulation, the development
2  July 2000Social Capital, Trust, and the Agribusiness of Economics  3
and maintenance of enduring business relationships represent a focal point or mode of
behavior for the agribusiness firm.
I believe the economic  theory of the agribusiness  firm resembles  a rope with four
intertwined conceptual cords or governing mechanisms: markets, contracts, hierarchies,
and social capital. These cords complement each  other, giving the "rope" explanatory
and predictive strength on which we hang our economic analysis. Here I concentrate on
the fourth strand, social capital-and more specifically trust-that supplies cohesion to
the other governing mechanisms to create internal and external organizational efficiency
for the agribusiness firm.
Why is this fourth strand important? Trust complements the other mechanisms  by
reducing uncertainty in markets, facilitating the management of unforeseen contingen-
cies in commercial contracts, establishing credence  in organizational hierarchies, and
creating valuable time resources that can be productively allocated to the logistics of
reaching business goals.
This paper is organized as follows. First, the concepts of social capital and trust are
defined.  A strong critique  of these concepts is then offered  from the point of view of
mainstream neoclassical  economics.  This is followed by an evaluation of empirical
evidence  for the existence  and  importance  of social  capital and trust in commercial
transactions. Finally, an attempt is made to answer the question "So what?"
Social  Capital
Social capital is "the potential benefits, advantages, and preferential treatment result-
ing from one person or group's sympathy and sense of obligation toward another person
or group" (Social Capital Interest Group).  Referred to as organizational  capital in the
resource-based theory of the firm, social capital is the consequence of complex human
interactions (Barney and McEwing). In the commercial business sphere,  social capital
changes the level and terms of transactions, internalizes externalities, and reduces the
cost of contractual obligations.
Our conventional neoclassical theory of the firm generally assumes no interdepen-
dencies  affecting  transactions  or exchanges.  Critics  of this conventional formulation
argue that the norm of mutual interest and reciprocity  should be embedded into our
economic models (Coleman  1984, 1988; Putnam 1993, 1995). Economic transactions,
according to Granovetter, are embedded in a system of interpersonal relationships and,
despite the calculus  of self-interest,  these economic exchanges  are conditioned by the
social system in which they occur.
Like other economic assets, social capital requires investment, it is not "manna from
heaven." Social capital has economic value. This value can depreciate, particularly if it
is not continuously maintained. Also, social capital can be transferred from one organi-
zation to another through merger and transfer of employees  carrying with them their
business relationships.
Social capital can be formulated as obligations, expectations,  and trustworthiness.
Efficient and effective information channels among suppliers, manufacturers, and retail-
ers represent a form of social capital (Kumar). Norms and effective sanctions within the
commercial sector also represent social capital. For example, the operations of the fresh
produce industry in North America represent a significant investment in social capital
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by individual companies and the sector as a whole (Wilson, Thompson, and Cook). Close
social networks and an effective  compliance  agency [i.e.,  the Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act (PACA)] combine to create an efficient distribution system for highly
perishable  products.
Social capital is not human capital in the strictly Stigler-Becker sense. Human capital
emphasizes human skills and knowledge embedded within the individual. Social capital
exists in a matrix or network of social relationships.  Both human capital and social
capital  can be measured as stock variables and augmented with flows-relational
investments.
Social capital reduces transaction  costs (North).  Search costs, the costs of finding
information  and business  partners, are  reduced.  Communication  between  business
associates over time and space is facilitated.  The time invested in ex ante and ex post
contract negotiations is reduced. Finally, the efforts devoted to policing and enforcing
agreements are minimized. In summary, social capital is a legitimate factor of production,
either substituting for another factor of production (e.g., lawyer hours) or complement-
ing the productivity of other assets, such as labor.
Trust
Like the broader concept of social capital, the difficulty of defining and operationalizing
trust in commercial transactions has led to more paralysis than analysis in economics
(Gambetta).  In recent years,  however,  economists  and organizational  theorists have
begun to analyze the role of trust in business more rigorously.  Repeated observations
of the prisoner's dilemma, communities of interest, and verbal contracts in the business
world motivate this effort.  Also, the recognition that economic agents are not blessed
with unlimited ability and time to map all possible contingencies in a transaction or
contract has led to this renewed interest. An entire recent (1998) issue of the Academy
of  Management  Review is devoted to the role of trust in society, principally in economic
relationships.
Sabel defines trust as "... the mutual confidence that no party to an exchange will
exploit the other's vulnerability" (p. 1133). Lyons and Mehta state that trusta  th  , a social
relation between two parties, exists when
... each party orients her behavior in whole or in significant part to her expectations of the
behavior of the other. Trust is a meaningful concept for the parties to a social relation if
and only if at least one party is exposed to an element of behavioral risk (p. 240).
Common  themes in these definitions  are the existence  of two parties,  a relationship
between  the two parties,  and  potential vulnerability  for one  or  both parties in the
exchange. This assessment of information and uncertainty is common in all commercial
transactions.
Generally, economists have assumed that trust either exists in a transaction or it does
not. Numerous authors recently have pointed out that trust is not only present in vari-
ous forms, but that a continuum of trust relationships exists in commercial transactions
(table  1). Trust can be developed  through  a process  of exchanges,  through  personal
identification with the other agent, or through an organization established to minimize
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Table 1.  Selected  Classifications  of Trust Relationships
Trust
Classification/
Author(s)  Hierarchy  Description
Zucker (1986)  Process-based  Developed through repeated transactions where a
credible reputation evolves.
Characteristic-based  Tied to the identity of a person or organization with
shared values,  beliefs, race, gender,  family, etc.
Institutional-based  Based on the existence of formal organizations with
responsibility for professional, business,  and/or
government regulation.
Sako (1992)  Contractual  Built on shared moral norms of honesty and promise-
keeping.
Competence  Shared understanding between parties of appropriate
professional  conduct and acceptable technical and
managerial standards.
Goodwill  Based on a consensus  among exchange parties on
what is fair in their transactions.
Shapiro, Sheppard, and  Deterrence-based  Developed through repeated transactions where the
Cheraskin (1992)  reputation  of the firm is held hostage. --------------------------------------------  ---------------
Knowledge-based  Established  on regular communication  and the
development of personal relationships that produce
dependability. ------------------- _----------------------------------------
Identification-based  One party in a transaction fully internalizes the
preferences of the other party, foregoing opportunism.
Barney and Hansen  Weak  Relationship  between exchange partners when the
(1994)  quality of goods and services can be evaluated at low
cost, transaction-specific  investments are low, and
vulnerabilities are limited.
Semi-strong  Established through the use of formal and informal
contractual  devices and reputation-based  governance
mechanisms.
Strong  Shared values, standards, and principles of behavior
are internalized  by both trading partners, imposing
high costs on opportunistic behavior.
Lyons and Mehta (1997)  Self-interest  Based on calculative behavior where incentives are
created intentionally to manage behavioral risk. ------------------- _----------  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __----------------_
Socially-oriented  A shared commitment to certain moral or ethical
principles,  emphasizing how decision makers are
bound together rather than calculative behavior.
Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt,  Calculus-based  Trust is developed when one of the parties in an
and Camerer (1998)  exchange  perceives that the other party intends to
perform in a beneficial manner.
Relational  Repeated interactions between agents over time
produce positive expectations concerning the
reliability and dependability of the parties.
Institutional  Organizational and cultural supports  (e.g., legal
system) which produce confidence that vulnerability
in exchanges will not be exploited. Similar to social
capital.
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vulnerability  in exchanges.  Depending on the degree  of opportunism,  a form of trust
exists in all commercial transactions.
Like other productive assets, trust can be invested in, trust has value, trust can be
lost or lose value, and trust is transferable to other relationships  through reputation.
In addition, trust is a time-dependent asset. Trust relationships evolve over time. Figure
1(a), based on the work of Barney and Hansen, and Lewicki and Bunker illustrates this
process.  Weak trust, or that level of trust often found in most commodity exchanges
where information is near perfect and vulnerability is limited, may be the predominant
form for a business at any point of time. Over a period of time, some of these weak trust
relationships may evolve into semi-strong trust, the use of formal or informal contracts,
because asset specificity has created vulnerability on the part of at least one party in the
exchange. Some of these semi-strong relationships in turn may evolve into strong form
trust, as defined by Barney and Hansen, where shared values  and beliefs discourage
opportunism even when one or both of the exchange partners is in a position of vulner-
ability. At any point in time, a business firm represents a portfolio of trust relationships.
This portfolio of exchange relationships evolves continually.
Rousseau  et al. characterize  institutional  trust, created by  ex ante  deterrents  or
supports, as a constant factor or "bandwidth" over time [figure l(b)]. Organizational and
societal factors embedded in transactions support the development and maintenance  of
calculus-based and relational trust. The authors conclude that a "rich diversity" of trust
will exist between two  parties at any given point in time. In addition, the trust mix
varies over the life of the relationship.
A Critique of Social  Capital and Trust
In 1980, long before Coleman's and Putnam's often cited works on social capital, Yoram
Ben-Porath published "The F-Connection" (i.e. families, friends, and firms) paper in a
rather obscure demography journal. This potentially seminal contribution to economics
analyzes the importance of  relationships and human identity in commercial transactions.
As reported by Griliches, this earliest of social capital work received a "cool reception"
by an editor of a mainstream economics journal, even after a favorable referee report,
because Ben-Porath's research provided useful insights but no clear, replicable model.
According to Griliches, the rejection of this contribution within the economics profession
was unfortunate because the issue of how social capital endures or collapses is of "great
importance" in our economic lives.
The Ben-Porath story illustrates the general skepticism within the economics profession
toward proposals  directed at the inclusion of social  capital and trust in mainstream
economics (Gardner; Solow; Williamson 1993). Much of this skepticism  is well placed
and well  deserved. As a colleague  of mine  often quotes,  "Anecdotal evidence  is an
oxymoron." The social capital and trust literatures until the last five years surely have
provided the profession with more rhetoric than fact. Economists should be able to tell
the policy maker "what will happen if...," and economists working in the social capital
arena have failed to provide a contribution associated with this professional responsi-
bility.
A first warning by the skeptics directed toward those economists interested in social
capital theory is a reminder that calculativeness is the dominant motivation in economic
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Sources: Adapted  from Lewicki and Bunker  (1996), and Barney and Hansen (1994).
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Figure 1.  Trust and time
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transactions.  Noncalculative behavior may be appropriate  study material for sociolo-
gists, but not for serious economists. There is no need for a new paradigm in economics.
Our neoclassical theory and its related  econometric tools serve society well. Coercion
and self-interest perform well in describing business management behavior. Incentives
and rules can be used to generate cooperation  and collaboration without an appeal to
social capital and trust.
Critics also warn that other social sciences dilute the analytical power of economics.
Sociology does not have a theory with a driver or central motivating force such as self-
interest. Therefore,  sociology is an immature, multi-paradigm social science with little
predictive power. This second warning raises the Occam's razor issue of losing scientific
standing by incorporating  complexity  into economic  models. Behavioral  simplicity is
preferable to human complexity that leads to scientific obscurity.
Finally, critics categorize work in social capital and trust as scientifically sterile since
these concepts  are incapable  of generating falsifiable  hypotheses  about economic
behavior. Without an operational measurement of trust, how can its incorporation into
economic  models  be tested  as an improvement in a positive or normative  sense?
Economics needs proof, not insights that are not testable. To quote Solow in his review
of Fukuyama's book:
I believe that the sorts of things that Fukuyama wants to talk about are more important
than my colleagues in economics are willing to admit. I would rather they were discussed
imprecisely than not discussed at all. But imprecision is not a virtue, and 'for example' is
not an argument. Academic social science is often narrow and boring, but it tends to root
out vagueness and inconclusive argumentation (p. 39).
Empirical Evidence from Business
Economists have begun to answer, at least partially, the theoretical and empirical doubts
associated  with the concepts  of social  capital and trust.  The Social  Capital Interest
Group (SCIG) at Michigan State University is leading the efforts to reduce the impre-
cision surrounding social capital in the agricultural  economics profession (Schmid and
Robison).  They demonstrate that commercial  interdependencies  can be incorporated
successfully into our standard optimization  models.  Empirically, Siles,  Robison, and
Hanson (1994a,b) interviewed bankers and bank customers to evaluate the strength of
the social relationships  between these agents. They found that social capital makes a
positive  difference  in receiving  a loan if your financial  records  show that you are  a
marginal borrower. Social capital also substituted for information in how the bankers
evaluated their customers. On the customer side, the authors discovered that customers
were less likely to switch banks for higher interest rates on their deposits if they had
friendly relationships with their bank's employees. Terms of trade were influenced by
the identity of the parties in these exchanges.
In his review of Fukuyama's book, Solow laments that accurate measures  of social
capital appear distant in our scientific future. Knack and Keefer tackle this frustration
by  econometrically  evaluating  data  from the World Values  Survey  of thousands  of
respondents from 29 countries. By developing an indicator for TRUST and an index for
CIVIC, the authors produce "the strongest evidence to date that trust and civic cooper-
ation have significant impacts on aggregate economic activity" (p. 1283). Trading agents
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in higher-trust countries have less need to invest in protection from opportunism. Formal
organizations that effectively protect property rights, thereby creating trust, create an
institutional environment for stronger economic performance. However, association mem-
bership is not positively correlated with economic performance, but the homogeneity of
population is. Interestingly, Knack and Keefer found a negative relationship between
the number of law students and the level of TRUST in a society.
Using the same World Values Survey data set, another group of researchers tested
the hypothetsis that trust is needed to support cooperation in large organizations, includ-
ing business corporations (La Porta et al.). Testing several of Fukuyama's hypotheses,
the  authors  found  that  an  increase  in  trust  raises  participation  in  professional
associations, in civic activities,  in the efficiency  of government,  and in the economic
performance  of large corporations.  In addition, the authors found that trust in large
firms substitutes for another governance mechanism, the family. In spite of economic
skepticism associated with the concept of trust, this statistical analysis of cross-sectional
data holds up well to the skeptic's yardstick of empirical relevance.
Turning to  the business  manager  more  directly,  Sak  reported  on the  economic
importance of trust relationships by analyzing 1,415 survey responses from component
suppliers in the Japanese, American, British, German, and Latin Catholic Europe auto
industries. Sako found that higher levels of trust were positively correlated with eco-
nomic performance among the suppliers. Goodwill trust was critical in this manufacturing
culture because contracts were incomplete and all contingencies could not be foreseen.
Trust was enhanced through information sharing and continuous interaction.
Burchell and Wilkinson interviewed 14 customer firms and 48 suppliers spread evenly
over manufacturers of kitchen furniture and mining machinery in Germany, Britain,
and Italy. Managers reported in the survey that trust has become an important business
tool due to the decline of trust in the economic environment. Business relationships built
on trust reduced risk and improved economic performance. Trust is simply defined by
many of the respondents as "doing what you say you will do." The authors present an
impressive statistical overview of the meaning of trust, strategies for establishing trust-
worthiness, how firms decide to trust other firms, and ways to deal with untrustworth-
iness. This empirically rich data set reveals  a diverse system of trust relationships
internal and external to the firm.
Wilson and Kennedy, in an empirical test of Barney and Hansen's conceptual frame-
work, found a varied system of trust relationships in six agribusiness firms. Semi-strong
form trust dominated  the economically  most important relationships with suppliers,
employees,  and customers.  Strong form trust did  exist in these  firms' internal  and
external  business  transactions,  but was  not  as important  as  formal  and  informal
contracting. Weak form trust, generally associated with market transactions where little
opportunism exists, was dominant in only one of the six firms. These six agribusiness
firms exhibited a diverse set of governance mechanisms, an empirical finding supportive
of the conceptual literature concerning trust portfolios.
The preceding literature creates a strong case for the existence and importance of trust
and social capital in business relationships. However, the literature fails to present an
empirically replicable model of how trust is produced and how trust reduces transaction
costs. Although Bhattacharya, Devinney, and Pillutla have derived a mathematically
precise definition of trust, empirical applications to business decisions are distant. Oper-
ationalizing trust in our standard analytical tools remains in its infancy and a welcome
challenge for selected economists.
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So What?
Implications for Agribusiness Economics
Social capital theory, rather than a new economic paradigm as some claim, represents
a challenging and relevant conceptual tool for economic analysis. Social capital consid-
erations  complement  other  economic frameworks.  As noted in the introduction,  the
theory of the agribusiness firm is a composite of these models rather than a single model
(e.g., production theory). Failure to recognize this portfolio of governance mechanisms
blurs our understanding of decision making at the firm level.
Agribusiness firms are a system of relationships between people. Trust provides the
cement or cohesion that holds these relationships together in support of business goals.
Trust-based  information  sharing, within and outside  the firm, produces  first-mover
competitive  advantages  for the business.  Trust also reduces uncertainty  in business
transactions. Assurance that the other party to a contract will act honorably (i.e., with-
out opportunism) under unforeseen circumstances  not covered by the contract creates
economic value for the firm. As noted by Milgrom and Roberts, "In a world of costly and
incomplete contracting,  trust is crucial to realizing many transactions" (p.  139).
Time is the agribusiness manager's scarcest resource. Trust produces time by freeing
time resources from ex ante and ex post contracting activities. This freed time is reallo-
cated to economically productive activities. Unfortunately, time as a productive resource
has received little attention in our agribusiness economics literature.
Several challenges emerge from this analysis for agribusiness economists. First, if  we
intend to understand the decision maker, agribusiness economists  should redouble our
efforts in primary data gathering at the firm level. We cannot be "unimplicated observers."
Business surveys  are a dying art in our profession. Markets,  especially  national and
international  markets,  are easier  and  cheaper to  study.  But aggregate  econometric
analysis  produces  limited  decision  value  for  the individual  agribusiness  manager.
Managers need detailed insights concerning their competitors' strategic behavior. They
also demand a keen understanding of specific markets, often down to the neighborhood
or household levels.
Primary data at the managerial level implies personal interviews. Personal interviews
imply personal contacts. Personal contacts imply personal relationships with agribus-
iness managers. This form of social capital differentiates agribusiness researchers from
many  of their departmental  colleagues  and  business  school  faculty (Westgren  and
Zering).  Firm-level data and information  lead to a  more intimate understanding  of
behavior underlying aggregate market analysis. Both types of economic analyses produce
value for society.
The existence  of trust will influence the firm-level data used in our models. We need
to be vigilant when social capital changes the terms of trade.  For example,  our tradi-
tional enterprise budgeting activities report and use input prices gathered from suppliers
and extension specialists. A troubling outcome of some budgeting activities is the histor-
ically poor return on agricultural  crops reported in these budgets.  In the case  of my
state, these returns to all assets have been so poor over the last 20 years that only a
fraction  of the 300,000  acres  of cotton in Arizona should be  planted each year.  One
explanation for this budgeting pessimism are the biased terms of trade reported in the
published budgets. If the price paid to a supplier is relationship based, input costs may
decline over time as the number of transactions increases.  So returns above variable
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costs may be much higher than our estimates.  Likewise, net price per unit sold may
increase as well due to fewer returns and favorable timing of payments.
Secondly, agribusiness economists should revisit Simon's bounded rationality models
of the firm (Simon; Simon et al.). Decision making under time constraints captures the
reality of day-to-day business operations more accurately than our traditional time-less
optimization models. Models of  time-bounded economic efficiency with trust as a produc-
tive input could create  a more realistic framework for optimization behavior.
Allocative  efficiency has driven most of our teaching and research in agribusiness
economics.  Successful  agribusiness  managers are  outstanding marginal analysts.
However, they struggle with organizational efficiency issues of how to design the firm
internally and structure external relationships  to reach their business goals. Most of
their business day is devoted to facilitating the work of their employees, searching for
ways to organize  and operate that reduce costs and/or create  markets. As economists
tackle the changing structure of global agribusiness, we will recognize that social capital
and trust, as cohesive  forces, form an important part of the core of modern organiza-
tional architecture.
Finally, the emphasis social capital and trust place on identity-based  transactions
creates an important bridge to our business school colleagues, an intellectual path more
traveled by some agribusiness  economists than others at this time. Economics  is the
integrative discipline for the science of business. Not only finance, but also management,
marketing, advertising, processing, human resources, strategy, and operations have an
economic core.  Economics permeates everything business executives  do. But academic
collaboration  across colleges by agribusiness economists requires the recognition that
economic relationships matter in firm-level decision making. Research and collaborative
teaching in these traditional business fields should be encouraged, not dismissed as "not
economics."
We are  challenged to rebuild the identity of our economic agents in our classroom
models and research methods in a rigorous fashion. The risk of scientific obscurity may
yield the surprising return of greater scientific relevance and predictive power.
[Received August 1999; final revision received February  2000.]
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